It was an interesting speech by Hussain Haqani promoting his book. He clearly mentioned : Pakistan’s leadership’s obsession with settling scores with India keeps them employing Jihadis in Kashmir. It was quite blunt actually.

Umair Ahmed Muhajir

1) I have been asked several times over the last year– by Pakistani acquaintances and relatives, by supporters of the BJP– what I thought about “the status of India as a secular democracy in light of what happened in Gujarat.” Now, I’ve thought a lot about this, since the 1992 Babri masjid demolition, the 1993 pogroms, and in a more focused way since the Gujarat pogroms, and I have to say at the outset that this is a very difficult question. Part of the difficulty lies in the extreme
partisanship that underlies so much of the debate over this issue over the past year– indeed I think it no exaggeration to say that most of what has been said on Godhra and the subsequent pogrom is very rarely considered on its merits, but is instead dismissed as “anti-Hindu” by many, “fascist” by others, and “an attempt to justify/excuse/overlook violence” by yet more. I must confess that I find it somewhat shocking that so many should have asked the question “is secularism dead?” in the wake of Gujarat. Consider: two thousand people have been massacred, a hundred and fifty thousand have been rendered homeless (some have put the figure even higher), and some people seem to mourn the “death” of “secularism” far more than the indisputable deaths of such large numbers of people. This is characteristic of the vacuousness, and even callousness, at the heart of so much debate in India– many Indians from the “educated classes” have always concerned themselves far more

with abstractions (like “secularism,” and in recent years, “Hindutva”) than with flesh-and-blood people [Case in point: contrast the outrage evoked by mistreatment of Muslims, because it implicates "secularism," with the relative indifference to caste- based atrocities, because that "merely" implicates "caste-ism,"
understood simply as a form of "backwardness" or prejudice by many]. The first question to ask is what one means by the term “secularism.” There are several possible answers to this question. Let’s start with something like a dictionary definition: as applied to politics, government, and statecraft, secularism would mean the absolute separation of religion from these aspects of life. In this sense secularism is certainly dead in India, but this begs the question as to whether it was ever “living” in any meaningful sense of the word. It can hardly be disputed that since 1947 India has never been a secular state in this sense. A more interesting
question is whether ANY state would pass the test were the bar set so high. For instance, Britain is not even formally a secular state, given that it has an official religion, the head of state also heads the religion, etc.. In the United States, which is formally secular, Christian imagery, symbolism, and rationale pervade political discourse (far more in some parts of the country than in others, obviously)– it’s even debatable whether any Presidential candidate could win these days without professing his religiosity, and it’s highly unlikely that a hard-core atheist would win even at the state- level in the USA (which serves as an interesting contrast to India, where at least one state– Tamil Nadu– has several times elected militantly anti-religious political figures since 1967). Having
said that, certainly Britain “feels” like a secular country, as does the USA for the most part. But this is not because of any British legal or conscious political commitment to secularism, but simply reflects the fact that organized Christianity has withered away in Britain (and many other Western countries); i.e. Britain, I would argue, “feels” secular more because the majority of the “Christian” population doesn’t care much for religion one way or

another (compared to the USA, church attendance, to use one barometer, is extremely low. Given that Indians (at least in my
experience, though I am aware that I am generalizing here) tend on average to be more attached to their religions than Britons are, it is to be expected that religion will play a greater role in public life in India than in Britain (when Brits were more attached to the Church of England, it was not particularly pleasant to be either a Jew or even a Catholic in that country, or for instance a Jew or a Protestant in France). In short, Britain is a “secular” country mainly for HISTORICAL reasons (which histories were of course not inevitable), and India, taking my “hard” definition of secularism as the benchmark, never has been. In the US, the founding fathers made a willed decision in favor of secularism, that is to say a POLITICAL decision. The same sort of political decision was made by at least two of India’s most prominent “founders,” Nehru and Ambedkar. But Nehruvian secularism (in the sense of how Nehru saw the issue, not the term-of-abuse the Congress has transformed it into) and even moreso Ambedkarite secularism was always (well, at least for the foreseeable future) going to be a minority viewpoint in India.

The above definition of secularism does not interest me all that much–more accurately, since I would certainly like my government to not be mixed up in religious matters, I should say that DEBATE on this issue does not really interest me very much, as it seems pretty much like an open and shut case: a country either professes this sort of secularism, or it does not; if it does profess this sort of secularism, various historical/social/political reasons will determine the “secular” nature of its society (think Britain: formally not secular, but “actually” far more secular than many theoretically secular countries like India), and of its polity. Gujarat or no Gujarat, this sort of secularism has not existed in a meaningful sense in India since the founding itself. There is another sense in which people use the term “secularism,” namely that secularism does not mean the absence of religion from politics and government, but that on the whole no one ought to be disadvantaged on account of religion. By whatever label we wish to call the latter, it seems to me a very worthy idea. Now where does this idea of secularism stand after Gujarat? Certainly in the violence-affected parts of Gujarat it would be a cruel joke to tell a Muslim that he/she has not been disadvantaged in the most extreme way because of his/her religion– that is simply not true, and all this talk of post-Godhra “reaction,” and all the various obfuscations
cannot hide that fact. Gujarat is not a secular state. Period. As was true of the Sikhs in 1984, or Bombay in 1993, minorities are grievously disadvantaged, because the state itself turns against them in times of crisis, and the very signs of citizenship– voter registration lists being a prominent example–are used to hunt them down, often with active police and politician participation. If this were all that could be said about the position of minorities in India, then even the question of secularism could not arise. But Gujarat is not contemporary India’s only communal reality. This is not to underplay Gujarat– it is certainly A reality of Indian life, but it is not the ONLY reality. Obviously, the media is structured to report the exceptional, the sensational, and has little incentive to report the innumerable ordinary instances of peaceful co- existence. It is important to assert that Gujarat is the heinous exception to the rule, but also to remember that it is in the heinous exception that disadvantage on the basis of religious affiliation manifests itself in the most extreme way possible. Yet there are also other realities: when I was growing up no state seemed to me more notable for communal violence than U.P.; when my parents and grand-parents were growing up perhaps no city was more famous for communal violence than Calcutta– and yet today both places compare very favorably to Gujarat. There is nothing in Gujarati, Bengali, or U.P. culture that makes communal violence more or less likely– what is different, and what made a difference, in U.P., Bihar, and West Bengal was a certain sort of politics, a politics that actively has tried to lessen the extreme disadvantages of massacre and mayhem based on religious affiliation, and (in U.P.) of systemic disadvantage on the basis of caste to some extent (though not yet on the basis of religion). Take the Left Front in West Bengal– one can criticize that government on a number of fronts (and that would be the subject of some other musing of mine), but I think it is beyond dispute that they have made the fostering of communal, relatively peaceful, co-existence one of their aims. What name shall we give this politics, or the politics of the Samajwadi Janata Party, or Laloo’s RJD, or the BSP, or of the Telegu Desam, or the current Congress government in Delhi, etc.? One such name, I believe, is “secular.” If Gujarat is India’s reality, these other examples are equally “real.” If Gujarat

is cited for the death of secularism, then these other places should be cited for the reverse, as places where a “secular” politics is struggling along (not always coherently, not even in a principled manner, but impossible to ignore nonetheless, trying to assert itself. So what does this say about India’s status as a secular country? My answer is another question: what sort of secularism is this, that dies in Gujarat, but seems alive and kicking in Calcutta? Is it fair to judge Calcutta on the basis of Gujarat? No, it is not. But one has to realize that many of those who say India’s claim to secular status is dead after Gujarat are not simply stating a fact, but they too have a political aim. The “two- nation theorists” are not really interested in answering the question “Is India secular or not?” at an

empirical level; rather, they already have a set view of what India “is,”–namely, not secular– and given that view it is not surprising that they have seized upon Gujarat, not as a pogrom, not as a manifestation of fascist violence, not even as a tragedy: they have instead seized upon it as revealing the very ESSENCE of India. This is as true of Praveen Togadia–who insists that Gujarat represents a watershed awakening for “Hindu Samaj”– as it is for Musharraf, who insists that Gujarat “shows” that Indian democracy is

simply a “bluff.” For both, then, Gujarat makes everything clear. Quite frankly, I have little patience with attempts to read an event as affording special insight into the essence of any country,
culture, or religion, particularly of one as fantastically complex and diverse as India. To read Gujarat as revealing the essence of India says more about one’s own ideological position than it does about India. India does not need such champion exegetes to give the Gujarat pogrom meaning–such people are interested only in judgments, not in contributing to anyone’s understanding, because they have already made up their minds. To repeat, if Gujarat shows all of these things, what does Calcutta show? For those of us who feel that Indians have not yet made up their minds, who feel that the country’s future every which way is still up for grabs, Gujarat does not “settle” the issue of secularism, but shows that the way ahead is unknown, difficult, but not hopeless; those who throw up their hands and say “it’s all over after Gujarat” (unless one is talking about the victims: in their situation despair is perhaps the only natural reaction) never had much invested in secularism in the first place. The above should not be misunderstood as a call for complacency– one reason we are at this pass as a country is because, faced with periodic outbursts of violence, the Congress-style secularists often respond with some platitude, such as “the people are basically secular.” This is drivel. “The people” are “basically” neither secular nor intolerant– i.e. “the people” can be tolerant, but they can also be frighteningly intolerant. It all depends on what sort of politics is gaining ground, what politics is being created– and “the people” are not just passive recipients of politics, but “make” politics every day in their own lives. The way to oppose bigotry and fascism is not to resort to abstractions, but to articulate a vision of politics that can effectively counter fascism. If fascist politics spreads everywhere, then no doubt Gujarat can happen in Calcutta, in U.P., in short everywhere; but if we react to Gujarat as if such politics already had taken over everywhere in
India, and that the succes of such politics is forever assured in Gujarat, then the latter will soon become a reality.

There is a third way in which one can use the term “secularism” in an Indian context. This approach recognizes that there is no hard separation between religion and politics in India, and that minorities are often grievously disadvantaged on the basis of religion (as in Gujarat, by the state itself)– the crucial thing is that secularism on this view is not a fact but an aspiration. We might not be very secular, but we are trying to be moreso, would be its mantra. This is how I understand the Indian constitution’s commitment to secularism: the Framers knew that in several respects secularism only existed on paper– but the paper expressed an ideal, and by virtue of being enshrined as an official ideal, India became more of a secular country than it otherwise would have been. But ideals must be nurtured– all too often, in recent years “secularism” is a word Indian politicians like to trot out only

in international settings, to taunt Pakistan and to show the West how much more enlightened and progressive India is compared to its neighbor. At home, the aspirational force of this ideal has certainly dimmed, and a stridency is in the air: “accomodation”
and “compromise” have become dirty words where communal relations are concerned (unless it’s the Sangh Parivar insisting Muslims do all the compromising), but there are plenty of people in India (and Gujarat has only highlighted this)for whom secularism (however one defines it) is still a worthy ideal. Will this be enough? I don’t know. But as long as the aspiration exists in some significant way in society, secularism (as defined in this third way) is not dead yet. The day no-one cares about secularism, the day secularism only
exists as a stick to beat Pakistan with in international fora, that day secularism will truly be dead. But as long as that day is not here in full force, let us not hasten its coming by writing secularism’s obituary.

2) With all due respect to those who say that Gujarat vindicates the two-nation theory, according to me these people have never begun to understand the two-nation theory, except perhaps in a superficial way. Probing deeper, and looking past the obvious Hindu-Muslim distinction (in the context of the two-nation theory), what was Gujarat (in the interests of brevity I will use “Gujarat” for the events in that state of the last year, though I fully recognize that is an abstraction, and doubtless unfair; I assume I’m among friends here) “about”? I get the sense that to many Pakistanis–who were doubtless appalled at the violence and sympathized with its predominantly Muslim victims– I think Gujarat was re-assuring, because the pogrom re-affirmed a world-view that Jinnah was “right” after all (no doubt this is only unconsciously true for many, but I suspect this to be the case). However, my impression is that many Indian Muslims were incredibly affected, combining anxiety (“it could be us tomorrow”) with defensiveness (“hey Gujarat is not Hyderabad”)– but that not many of them (at least that I know of) saw this as vindication of the two-nation theory, but of how dangerous a BJP majority unfettered by the NDA could be. In other words, they located Gujarat in the political realm, seeing it as the manifestation of a very dangerous and disturbing type of politics, in contrast to the Pakistanis (whether acquaintances, relatives, or journalists, etc.) I have come across it,who saw it as a reflection of the essential relation– a conflictual one– between two nations, one Hindu and one Muslim. I am in complete accord with the view I have characterized above as characteristic of Indian Muslims (as opposed to Pakistanis, recognizing here that I am speaking of two abstractions). To put it bluntly: Gujarat does not vindicate the two-nation theory, because Gujarat is itself precisely a manifestation of the same sort of thinking as the two-nation theory is. Think of some examples: Modi’s relentless, albeit implicit, equation during the election campaign of Muslims with “Mian Musharraf”; Togadia’s “Let them take blood tests”; Savarkar’s “I agree with Mr. Jinnah– there are two nations in Hindustan”; the

RSS’ support for the trifurcation of Jammu & Kashmir along religious lines; Thackeray’s telling Time magazine that the “solution” to the Muslim “problem” was to “kick them out.” The attitudes displayed by Savarkar (whose portrait now adorns Parliament), Modi, Thackeray, and Togadia is, philosophically speaking,precisely the attitude of those who said Pakistan was necessary–except that it comes from the opposite direction. Gujarat shows the violence lurking at the heart of the two-nation theory; Gujarat, in essence, shows the violence inherent in the foundational idea of Pakistan. Pakistanis
cannot look at Gujarat and say “this is why we wanted our own country,” because it is only when we look at Hindus and Muslims as representative of distinct nations that Gujarat happens. What I’m trying to say is that the VHP/Bajrang Dal/RSS are the mirror image of the idea of Pakistan. Gujarat, then, is yet another reason to reject the Two-Nation theory (though of course, we had not been lacking for reasons to reject it prior to Gujarat). [Given what I've written above, it is also why I believe that the gentlemen whose words were quoted above are, in my view, and contrary to what Mr. Venkaiah Naidu had to say about organizations like the VHP, among the biggest
traitors in India]. The Togadia dream– of an India for the Hindus, by the Hindus, ruled by Hindus, heck even called “Hindu-stan” as he said recently(i.e. in the religious, as opposed to the traditional geographical, sense) as opposed to “Bharat” or “India”– what does this sound like? Does it not sound more like Pakistan than anything else? Some of my interlocutors had already made up their
minds on the issue. Some of them even gloat that Pakistan, with all its problems, does not have the sort of large-scale mob violence as happened in Gujarat. I never tire of pointing out to them that there are no anti-minority pogroms in Pakistan because Pakistan is already the kind of state that the VHP wants to make Gujarat, and then the rest of India. If the primacy– not only practical but also symbolic and intellectual–of Hindus AS Hindus above all else was conceded in India, Togadia too would not be so hysterical; but it is precisely because there is a democratic–even if violent– debate on this issue in India, it is precisely because not only the desirability of a Hindu rashtra, but even of what Hindutva means, and of what secularism means, are hotly contested,that the fascists in India try and “settle” the issue by creating “facts on the ground”– these pogroms serve a purpose for them, assisting them in their attempts to constitute a “Hindu nation.” If none of these things were in dispute– as they are not in Pakistan– then where would be the need for a pogrom? In other words, as I keep reminding my Pakistani interlocutors, there is no need for a pogrom in Pakistan, because minorities already “know their place”– i.e. out of sight and out of

mind. What enrages the fascists in India is that we (i.e. people “like” me) refuse to “know our place” in India, which is one of the reasons they keep harping on the condition of
minorities in Bangladesh, etc. Their anger, their rage, is a sign of some good: a sign that they have not won the war– as opposed to some battles yet. More atrocious than their anger would be the sort of complacency one sees among Pakistani politicians on this issue– complacency because, in Pakistan, the Modis and Jinnahs (incongruous though that juxtaposition is in many ways, it is apt in the context of this discussion) of the world have already won.

Sincerely, Umair Ahmed Muhajir

You mean after it got eviscerated when the Pakistani army commited the biggest anti-Muslim genocide of the twentieth centruy against its own Muslim Bengali brothers?

Say what you like about India my friend – the RSS can only dream of slaughtering as many Muslims as the Two Nation Theory Republic of Pakistan has – dont forget that genocide – ever – and what it means about the TNT

Hahaha…I didn’t realize you could resurrect its ghost from the bottom of the Bay of Bengal .

In any case, justification for TNT using Modi’s re-election is a classic Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc fallacy (http://www.datanation.com/fallacies/posthoc.htm).

Even if I were to let that one slip, TNT would still be validated only if

1.Gujju muslims were lining up to immigrate to Pakistan or Bangladesh OR 2.Muslims from other parts of India were suicide-bombing or indulging in other terririst acts against Gujju Hindus OR 3.Indian society at large had condoned or supported the acts of Modi government OR 4.Indian government had unleashed a muslim genocide like Yahya did in East Bengal OR 5.The BJP government had fought an election campaign on the basis of upholding Modi’s actions as heroic AND won the Indian general election.

Callous as it may sound, less than thousand people dying in communal riots with almost one third of them being Hindus, inspite of the grave provocation of a dastardly attack by Muslims on Hindu pilgrims is just a blip on the subcontinent’s bloody history. Let’s just imagine for a second what would’ve happened if the tables were turned and a bunch of Hindu radicals in Pak or Bangladesh had burnt a train carrying Muslim hajis returning from Mecca or something. The resulting genocide would’ve eliminated whatever few traces of Hindu civilization that are left in those benighted lands.

Try again, buddy…you’ll need a lot more illogical contortions to justify TNT. Anyway, this is almost off-topic so I am not going to debate this any more. If you believe in TNT, more power to you. Just one request : please teach TNT to all the South Asia-wallahs, especially Indians, around you and educate them how justified the existence of Pak on the basis of the morally superior theory of TNT is and how Paks and Bangladeshis hailing from model secular democracies can have no truck with the vile infidels hailing the from terribly communal country of India – unless, of course, they subscribe to the TNT themselves.

As a 1990 ISI report on the future of U.S.-Pakistan relations concluded: “It was important to maintain the impression of widespread anti-U.S. sentiment in Pakistani society, which could be assured by periodic demonstrations by Islamists. This would create sympathy for Pakistani military and intelligence officials among their US counterparts.” Flash forward to 2005: Gen Musharraf’s regime bans the protest rallies of journalists, feminists and members of the Pakistan People’s Party, headed by former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. Meanwhile, Islamists manage to hold anti-American “million man marches” throughout the country. How little times have changed.

WSJ review of Hussain Haqqani’s book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military

Ex-Pakistan cricketer Javed Miandad has invited President Pervez Musharraf to a celebration of his son’s controversial wedding to a fugitive’s daughter. Junaid Miandad married Mahrukh Ibrahim, daughter of Dawood Ibraham, a man the US suspects of al-Qaeda links, at a lavish ceremony in Dubai on 23 July. Dawood Ibrahim is also wanted by India over a series of bombs that killed 300 people in Mumbai in 1993.

BBC link

The Sikhs realised how completely terrorism was in conflict with the tenets of their faith and that is how the Khalistani movement was defeated. The Pakistan-backed movement in the name of their religion would be finally eliminated only when the Muslims openly and forcefully reject this perversion of Islam For four years now, I have argued repeatedly that the footprint of every major act of international terrorism passes inexorably through Pakistan, and I had an extended list compiled of hundreds of incidents that confirm this thesis, which was widely circulated. Many Pakistani commentators and sympathisers attacked this evidence as ‘Indian propaganda’. But in his address to the nation on July 21, 2005, spurred by the second series of terrorist attacks in London in two weeks, Pakistan’s President, General Pervez Musharraf, finally conceded, “Wherever these extremist or terrorist incidents occur in the world, a direct or indirect connection is established with this country (Pakistan).”

KPS Gill on Outlook India

Musharraf (aka the Mullah-Military complex) gives a damn about international opinion. When pushed, he pulls yet another Al-Queda No. 3 (mostly low lives!) out of his deep pocket, while U.S. military aid (F-16s, naval destroyers, etc. to capture Al-Queda leaders!) has been dramatically increased post-9/11. I think Bush made a deal with him NOT to attack U.S. in exchange for these sops. Even after 7/7 attacks, he blamed the UK for it’s “home-grown” Islamist problem. Watch out for more aid pouring in from UK to “reform” Pakistan’s madrassah system. Don’t expect him to crack down on Kashmiri terrorist group.

I’d have to point out that Musharraf’s political calculus is simple: as far as he’s concerned, allowing non-governmental sponsorship such groups is acceptable as long as they don’t interfere with his primary political agenda. The problem is, he’s not quite sure of that agenda himself.

So right now it’s mainly non-governmental support? Or are they still receiving training, aid and logistical support from the ISI? Cites are useful, but so are comments from people in Pakistan who know what’s happening on the ground Please, continue to enlighten us SinSahib!

Nitin said:

Lashkar and Jaish are just public manifestations of a militant apparatus loosely linked to seminaries and religious political formations. These come in handy to settle Pakistan’s domestic problems — cutting the Gilgit Shias down to size, for example.

So there is a strong domestic militant constituency that produces Lakshar, Jaish, and is now training a new Taliban, right? OK, but are the interests of this domestic constituency aligned with those of Musharraf? Do they do his dirty work directly, or do they just oppress inconvenient groups in Pakistan controlled Kashmir?

Nitin also said:

It is not that Musharraf cannot clamp down on Jaish and Lashkar. But he won’t do so in the same way as he won’t cut off his right hand (Pakistan’s nuclear establishment is the left).

Again, this raises the question of control. Are they receiving direct assistance from the government? If not, are their aims the same? How unpredictable are they? Pakistan is bearing some international cost for this; are Jaish and Lakshar anything more than bargaining chips to be tolerated now and traded in later?

I apologize if my questions are naive to those of you who have thought about this more. This is how I learn, by openly constructing and exploring an argument. And while most of my posts here try to be pithy and snarky, since this is (in part) my blog, I figured I would abuse my privilege and use it for my own enlightenment rather than the amusement or edification of our readers …

Pakistan also needs an army for reasons of domestic pacification.

More broadly though, I don’t know if I would support these groups if I was in Musharraf’s shoes. Do my key supporters care any more about Kashmir than the average Pakistani? If not, then why support them when it makes Pakistan an international pariah? Sure, Musharraf has been able to stay on the good side of the USA but only at a high price. While the US doesn’t care about Pakistani terrorism against India in particular, it still damages Pakistan’s reputation overall. What are the benefits?

Do they do my bidding, or are they just a loose cannon? In general, groups like that are only useful if they operate like proxies. If not, you don’t want to feed them.

Once upon a time, these groups made sense as part of a strategy to keep India off balance, to say you might be able to defeat us in an all out war, but we can make your life more or less miserable. They were bargaining chips then. Are they still?

Cracking down on them, once they exist, is a different matter. The costs involved can be high, so Musharraf might tolerate them rather than shut them down.

But the logic isn’t clear to me, which is why I’m inviting people to think out loud and contribute sources that discuss the question of how much support these groups receive and why …

But Sin is right, you very seriously overestimate the importance of India to Pakistanis. The integreation, disintegration or diffrentiation if India is pretty irrelevant. Even vaunted Kashmir is more a notion — even educated Pakistanis are unaware of the differences between Azad Kashmit and Gilgit-Baltistan, despite the fact that maps are shown on PTV weekly.

My own theoryy — the army in Pakistan needs a copnflict with India to justify its own regime. Without Kashmir, what’s the justification in military officers getting nice houses in Defence? Supporting LeT and others costs Musharraf nothing. It ensures a low level conflict with India, appeases the more Jihadi Mullahs (fight India, not the USA) , and preserves a bargaining chip to use if Kashmir is ever negotiated.

Yoy could answer your own question, ennis. If you were Musharraf, wouldn’t you support the LeT and Jaish?

Also, the ISI is not some separate entity, it is their country’s intelligence service, and very much part of the Government of Pakistan. It remains active in this business because the rest of the Govt of Pakistan lets it, else the only other conclusion is that it IS the Govt of Pakistan.